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INTRODUCTION
In 1973, Sotheby Park Bernet (now Sotheby’s) auctioned off
fifty works from famed New York City taxi magnate Robert
Scull’s art collection.1 The auction realized well over two million
dollars in sales—the highest price of $240,000 going to Jasper
Johns’ Double White Map.2 But the most notable sale might have
been Robert Rauschenberg’s Thaw, which Scull purchased from
well-known art dealer Leo Castelli for $900 many years prior.3
Thaw sold for $85,000—a 9400% gain.4 The sale upset the artist,
who happened to be present during the auction, and prompted him
to confront Scull and yell, “I’ve been working my ass off for you
1
See Baruch D. Kirschenbaum, The Scull Auction and the Scull Film, 39 ART J. 50,
50 (1979).
2
See id.
3
See John Henry Merryman, The Wrath of Robert Rauschenberg, 41 AM. J. COMP. L.
103, 110 (1993).
4
See id.
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to make all that profit.”5 From that point on, Rauschenberg
became a strong proponent of droit de suite,6 or artist’s resale
royalty rights—a right giving the artist a share in the proceeds
when his or her artwork is resold on the secondary market—and he
would see some success when in 1976 droit de suite legislation
eventually passed in California.7
More recently, droit de suite has garnered increased attention.
Late in 2011, several lawsuits were filed in California based on
various auction houses’ failure to pay artists in accordance with the
state’s droit de suite statute.8 In December 2011, both houses of
the U.S. Congress introduced legislation9 that would implement a
federal droit de suite similar to those found in Europe.10 Finally,
on January 1, 2012, Great Britain fully implemented its 2006 droit
de suite statute for the estates of deceased artists in order to comply
with a 2001 European Union directive requiring all member states
to implement such laws.11
Although proponents have recently been attempting to
strengthen the right of droit de suite globally, all laws based on the
right are flawed—so much so that further implementation would
have almost none of the positive effects that its sponsors hope for.
This is to say that droit de suite, which is meant to protect young
artists,12 actually discourages the creation of art by young artists,

5
See id. Some sources say Rauschenberg actually physically assaulted Scull. See
Kirschenbaum, supra note 1, at 51.
6
See Merryman, supra note 3, at 110.
7
See Cal. Civ. Code § 986 (West 2012), invalidated by Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s
Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
8
See, e.g., Estate of Graham, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1117; Sam Francis Foundation v.
eBay Inc., 2:11-cv-08622-JHN-PLA (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2011).
9
S. 2000, 122th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); H.R. 3688, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
10
See infra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
11
See Henry Lydiate, Artists Resale Right: 4th Year Report, ARTQUEST (2010),
http://www.artquest.org.uk/articles/view/artists-resale-right-4th-year-report# (stating that
2010 was the fourth anniversary of the UK’s droite de suite law, the Artist’s Resale
Right).
12
Throughout this article, I use the term “young artists” to refer to visual artists who
have not yet gained wide acceptance of their work throughout the art world. That is,
“young artists” may or may not be younger than their peers, but there is likely no market
for their work on the resale market where droit de suite income is derived. This term
would include artists such as Jean Francois-Millet, discussed infra in Part I.A, whose
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and reduces the amount of money an artist can make from a sale.
Furthermore, droit de suite conflicts with basic common law
notions of copyright and property and is incompatible with
standard theories of intellectual property law.
This paper discusses how droit de suite works in practice,
providing a detailed analysis of its failures and an explanation of
why attempts to further promulgate the right in common law
nations should be quashed. Part I provides a history of droit de
suite followed by a general overview of the contemporary art
market and an explanation of the droit de suite directive in effect in
Europe. Part II analyzes the EU droit de suite directive and
discusses its justifications, how it works in practice, and who
benefits, with an emphasis on the fact that it fails to achieve its
goals. Part III explains why droit de suite should not be further
promulgated throughout the world. This Part also addresses a
number of policy concerns that should discourage further droit de
suite implementation, and then discusses the three major theories
of copyright and the incompatibility between droit de suite and
each theory, in an attempt to bolster opposition to further
implementation of droit de suite.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF DROIT DE SUITE AND ART MARKETS
A. History of Droit de Suite
Droit de suite literally means “follow-up right,” but is more
generally understood as an artist’s resale royalty right, which
provides the artist with a certain percentage of the sale price when
his work is resold on the secondary art market.13 The right is
considered by many to be a moral right because it is inalienable
and unwaiveable, and because it is often justified through the
personhood theory of copyright, which suggests that the creator of
a work never really gives up all of the property interests in the

work had not yet caught on but would eventually, as well as artists whose work is sold
from time to time but will never gain wide appreciation and success.
13
See infra notes 53–59 and accompanying text.
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work, as it is actually a part of the creator’s personhood.14 At the
same time, however, some argue droit de suite is more like an
economic right because it simply provides a pecuniary benefit to
the artist.15 Whichever it is, droit moraux or droit patrimoniaux,
the artist’s resale royalty right developed out of the France’s
original version of copyright, or droit d’auteur, which was born
during the French Revolution.16
1. Moving Out of Patronage
From before the Renaissance until roughly the seventeenth
century, artists worked solely as patrons of the Church or the State
and they were compensated as laborers.17 But by the eighteenth
century, artists were recognized as intellectual workers who
“needed legal protection in order to dedicate themselves to their
work for ‘the best interest of the public.’”18 This idea led to the
development of droit d’auteur, which granted playwrights, writers,
and artists the exclusive rights of performance and reproduction for
the duration of their lives plus a number of years beyond the
author’s death.19 However, French courts began to recognize the
additional rights of disclosure, attribution, integrity, and retraction
based primarily on the idea that authors’ creations are a part of
their personhood and augmented these laws.20

14

See Diane B. Schulder, Art Proceeds Act: A Study of the Droit de Suite and a
Proposed Enactment for the United States, 61 NW. U. L. REV. 19, 21–22 (1966).
15
See id. at 22.
16
See LILIANE DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, THE DROIT DE SUITE IN LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC PROPERTY: A COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY 1 (Louise-Martin-Valiqueet trans.,
1991); see also Michael B. Reddy, The Droit de Suite: Why American Artists Should
Have the Right to a Resale Royalty, 15 LOY L.A. ENT. L. REV. 509, 513 (1995).
17
PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 16, at 1.
18
Id.
19
See id. at 1 n.1 (“The Law of January 19, 1971 grants to playwrights, for their entire
life, and to their heirs, for a period of five years after their death, the exclusive right to
have their works performed. The Law of July 19, 1973 grants to writers and artists an
exclusive right to have their works reproduced. The same right is given to their heirs for
a period of ten years after their death.”).
20
See Cheryl Swack, Safeguarding Artistic Creation and the Cultural Heritage: A
Comparison of Droit Moral Between France and the United States, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L.
& ARTS 361, 372–80 (1998).
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2. Additional Protection for Visual Artists
By the beginning of the twentieth century, scholars began to
recognize that visual artists did not benefit from the droit d’auteur
to the same degree as other authors such as writers and
composers.21 This assumption laid the foundation for the droit de
suite discussion. Gone were the days when artists could rely on
patronage from the Church and State for their livelihoods. Artists
necessarily had to earn a living by selling their artwork to
collectors; but “greedy” dealers often took them advantage of
them.22 Proponents of the droit de suite would cite lamentable
cases of artists living in ruin while dealers made extraordinary
profits on certain sales. One famous example is that of JeanFrancois Millet’s Angelus. While Millet’s heirs lived on the streets
selling flowers to survive,23 an art dealer, who had purchased
Angelus for 70,000 francs some years prior, sold the painting for
one million francs—and Millet’s family saw none of the profits.24
The French Parliament took pity on the Millets, Cezannes, and
Gauguins of the world—artists who “died in misery at a time when
their paintings were bringing enormous sums” for dealers—and
passed droit de suite into law in 1920.25
Droit de suite supposedly “remed[ied] the unfair plight of the
artist, forced to earn a living by his work and powerless vis-à-vis a
greedy dealer. It responded to the need to readjust the balance of
economic forces involved.”26 It would spread to Belgium one year
later, and then to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Uruguay, and Italy.27
Realistically, however, it was only enforced in France and
Belgium.28 In 1948, the Berne Convention for the Protection of
21

See PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 16, at 1–2.
See id. at 2.
23
See Rita E. Hauser, The French Droit de Suite: The Problem of Protection for the
Underprivileged Artist Under Copyright Law, 11 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 1, 1 (1962).
24
See PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 16, at 2.
25
Hauser, supra note 23, at 2–3.
26
PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 16, at 4.
27
See id. at 4–5 (explaining that Belgium followed suit by adopting its own version of
droit de suite on June 25, 1921, followed by Czechoslovakia in 1926, Poland in 1935,
Uruguay in 1937, and Italy in 1941).
28
See id. at 5 (stating that although droit de suite was recognized in a few “scattered
statutes” across a small group of countries, it was “in effect applied only in France and
Belgium”).
22
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Literary and Artistic Works was amended to allow for a droit de
suite, but stopped short of making it compulsory.29
The
amendment did not create sufficient incentive to convince a single
nation to adopt the right.30 But in 1965, Germany implemented its
own droit de suite statute31 and many European civil law nations
followed suit throughout the 1970s.32
3. Modern Droit de Suite
In 1976, California became the first U.S. state to create an
artist’s resale royalty right,33 but no other U.S. state has recognized
the right. After the United States took steps to become a signatory
to the Berne Convention, Congress considered implementing droit
de suite among other moral rights for artists.34 Although a droit de
suite was considered in early drafts of the Visual Artists’ Rights

29

See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 14ter,
Sept. 9, 1886, as amended Sept. 28, 1979, S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-27 (1986) [hereinafter
Berne Convention] (“The [droit de suite] may be claimed in a country of the Union only
if legislation in the country to which the author belongs so permits, and to the extent
permitted by the country where this protection is claimed.”).
30
See PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 16, at 5.
31
See id. at 229 (Art. 26 of Germany’s Act Dealing with Copyright and Related Rights
of September 9, 1965 states “should the original of an artistic work be resold or should
such resale involve an art dealer or auctioneer as purchaser, vendor or agent, the vendor
shall pay the author a participation at the rate of one per centum of the sale price. There
shall be no obligation if the sale price is less than five hundred German marks.”).
32
See id. at 6 (explaining that “since 1965, the droit de suite has found a second wind:
an increasing number of countries, now totaling 28, have incorporated it into their
statutes”).
33
See Cal. Civ. Code § 986 (West 2012), invalidated by Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s
Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2012). California’s droit de suite statute provides
for a five percent royalty on all sales of $1000 or more subsequent to the original sale
with no maximum royalty. See id. The statute has proven difficult to enforce, however,
as is evidenced by the recent lawsuits filed in California. See cases cited supra note 8 and
accompanying text. In Morseburg v. Baylon, 621 F.2d 972, 978 (1980), California’s
droit de suite statute was found to be not preempted by the copyright act of 1909, but no
challenges had been brought against the law as to its validity under the Copyright Act of
1976 until 2012 when a California district court found the law in violation of the dormant
commerce clause at least as it is applied to artwork out of state. See Estate of Graham v.
Sotheby’s Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d. 1117, 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
34
See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987: Hearing on H.R. 3221 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
100th Cong. 81–82 (1988) (statement of R. Frederick Woolworth, President, Art Dealers
Association of America).
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Act of 1990, the final bill passed without a resale royalty right,35
merely prompting the U.S. Copyright Office to perform a study on
the feasibility of implementing such a right for U.S. artists.36 The
Copyright Office concluded that droit de suite should not be
implemented in the United States, but that it would reconsider such
a conclusion if Europe implemented the right more broadly.37
In 2001, the European Union passed a directive requiring all
member states to partially implement a droit de suite by 2006, with
full implementation required by 2012.38 As the global trend seems
to be moving in the direction of maintaining a droit de suite,
Congress has once again proposed bringing it to the United States.
In late 2011, bills were introduced in both the Senate and the
House that would require a seven percent royalty on auctions of
visual art exceeding $10,000.39 Half of the royalty would go to the
artist or her heirs, while the other half would be deposited into an
account established “for the purposes of funding purchases by
nonprofit art museums in the United States of works of visual art
authored by living artists domiciled in the United States.”40
B. The Global Contemporary Art Market
1. Impressionism to Contemporary Art
The contemporary art market has changed significantly since
the days of the “greedy” dealers who supposedly took advantage of
French Impressionists.41 Prior to the 1950s, Paris was still the

35

See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994).
See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 608(b), 80 Stat.
5089 (1990).
37
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. REG. OF COPYRIGHTS, DROIT DE SUITE: THE ARTIST’S
RESALE ROYALTY 149 (1992) (explaining that “the Copyright Office is not persuaded that
sufficient economic and copyright policy justification exists to establish droit de suite in
the United States. . . . Should the European Community harmonize existing droit de suite
laws, Congress may want to take another look at the resale royalty, particularly if the
Community decides to extend the royalty to all its member States”).
38
See Council Directive 2001/84, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32 (EC).
39
See S. 2000, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); H.R. 3688, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
40
See S. 2000, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
41
See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text.
36
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center of the contemporary art world.42 At the beginning of the
twentieth century, when droit de suite first became law in France,
Impressionist painters were not allowed in the salons—the official
art exhibitions of the Société des Artistes Français in Paris.43 The
emerging bourgeoisie (young and newly rich businessmen) had a
desire to buy art, but likewise were prohibited from participating in
the art establishment, which was controlled by old money.44 Some
art dealers took advantage of this situation by purchasing art from
poor artists who were willing to sell their paintings for bargain
prices directly to the dealers, who would occasionally turn
extraordinary profits.45 But the art dealers did not simply buy the
art and sell it—they also had to convince the bourgeoisie that it
was a worthy investment. Dealers and critics were able to leverage
social, political, and economic structures to develop a completely
new market for art that artists likely would not have been able to
create for themselves. Somewhat ironically, without the very
dealers who supposedly used artists’ unfavorable positions for their
own gain, there might never have been a market for the artists’
work at all.46
After World War II, New York City’s transition from a cultural
follower to a cultural leader began with the art movement of
abstract expressionism.47 Much like in France, contemporary art in
New York attracted new buyers looking for both status symbols
and investments. Before the war American art was bought mostly
by people with old money, but between 1940 and 1985 young
entrepreneurs and business corporations became common buyers.48
The old collectors were very hesitant to sell their art, but these new

42

See Nobuko Kawashima, The Droit de Suite Controversy Revisited: Context, Effects
and the Price of Art, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 223, 233 (2006) (discussing that the commercial
market of artworks made by living artists emerged also in Paris during the late nineteenth
century); see also DIANA CRANE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AVANT-GARDE: THE NEW
YORK ART WORLD, 1940–1985 1 (1987) (citing Seuphor, a French art critic, who
discussed that before the 1950s “nearly all the original conceptions came from Paris”).
43
See Kawashima, supra note 42, at 233.
44
See id. at 233–34.
45
See PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 16, at 2–3.
46
See Kawashima, supra note 42, at 233.
47
See id.
48
See id. at 234.
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buyers were much more willing to sell in order to make profits or
to improve their collection.49
With this change, the modern contemporary art market was
born. Sotheby’s and Christie’s, two of the biggest auction houses,
began to hold regular contemporary art auctions. Buying art
started to be seen as an investment, albeit a risky one: much of the
money coming into the art market came from speculators and art
investment funds.50
But the modern art market is a sophisticated machine with
many more players than just artists and buyers. As Professor John
Henry Merryman, a chief opponent of droit de suite, puts it:
The main components of the art world, in addition
to artists, are dealers and auctioneers, collectors,
museums and their professional personnel, art
historians, and art critics and the art press. Within
the art world, the art market is the principal medium
for the distribution of art and the compensation of
artists. The art world has an ecology, its own set of
inner relationships and interdependencies. As in
other ecologies, what affects one part resounds
throughout the system and is felt by all the others.51
Accordingly, the value of art is dependent on many variables.
While the quality of a painter’s craft is important, it also matters
what the art press says about the art, where it is being exhibited,
and who is buying it, for example.
2. Primary and Secondary Art Markets
The contemporary art market operates in two interdependent
spheres: primary and secondary sales. Primary sales take place, for
the most part, in galleries and at art fairs, while secondary sales
mostly occur at auctions.52

49

See id.
See id. (stating that the Robert Scull sale “is said to have been a watershed for the
market of contemporary art, opening the gates to speculative investments in art”).
51
Merryman, supra note 3, at 105.
52
See id. at 105–06.
50
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The primary art market no longer pits dealers against artists—
today’s gallery model has changed significantly since the “greedy”
dealers were profiting off of Impressionist masters in the first few
decades of the twenty-first century. Modern galleries work on a
consignment basis.53 Dealers take a commission from sales of
art—often as much as fifty percent—but this means that the dealer
benefits from a higher price just as the artist does, so there is no
incentive to pay the artist less than the work is worth. Moreover,
dealers do not simply take an artist’s work and wait for the buyers
to walk in. The dealer spends much time promoting his artists—
usually through gallery exhibitions—and he must take a large risk
by investing money up front for expenses such as storage, rent,
advertising, and sometimes advances on future commissions to
artists.54 The result is that contemporary art dealers are actually
“genuinely interested in and capable of supporting and promoting
the artist’s work”55 and have an interest in seeing the artist succeed
as the “caretakers of artists’ careers.”56 The bottom line is that the
dealer’s interests are no longer adversarial to those of the artists—
the dealer only gets rich if the artists get rich.
The secondary art market is almost exclusively beneficial to
work by artists who have already shown themselves to be a success
on the primary market. According to Merryman, only two or three
hundred of the hundreds of thousands of working artists in
America have a significant secondary market for their work.57
This secondary market is heavily focused in New York City. In
fact, the United States accounts for over forty-three percent of the
world’s contemporary art auctions, while the UK is home to thirty
percent of such auctions, and France now only holds about 6.6%.58
This disparity in market share is one of the factors that led to the
53

See id. at 105.
See id.
55
Id.
56
Alice Gregory, On the Market: Sotheby’s. New York. 2009–Present, 13 N+1 185,
188 (2012) (“[The dealers’] job is to develop those careers, and to establish relationships
with buyers whose past purchasing habits show discernment.”).
57
Merryman, supra note 3, at 106.
58
See Kawashima, supra note 42, at 237 (stating the countries’ percentage of share
and comparing them through an elaborated table titled “Table 1 fine art auction sales by
country: 2003/2004 season”).
54
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EU’s droit de suite directive in 2001: nations that had previously
not implemented a droit de suite—including the U.S. and UK—
controlled a great majority of the world’s secondary market sales
of contemporary art.59
C. Overview of Directive 2001/84/EC
1. Application of Droit de Suite
With the disparity of market share of contemporary art sales in
mind, the European Union passed its droit de suite directive in
2001.60 The EU droit de suite applies to “graphic or plastic art
such as pictures, collages, paintings, drawings, engravings, prints,
lithographs, sculptures, tapestries, ceramics, glassware and
photographs, provided they are made by the artist himself or are
copies considered to be original works of art.”61 The directive
imposes a tiered royalty scheme that ranges from four percent of
the sale price up to the first €50,000 to 0.25% for the sale price
above €500,000, with a maximum royalty of €12,500.62 The term
of the resale royalty right is tied to the length of copyright, so it
currently lasts for the life of the artist plus seventy years.63 The
directive also allows for collective management organizations to
collect the royalties and find the artists to whom they belong.64
Importantly, the resale royalty right is inalienable and
unwaiveable, so even if the artist transfers her copyright to a third
party, she still retains her resale royalty right.65
The directive required each Member State to implement a droit
de suite law benefitting artists and their heirs by 2006,66 but it
59

See Council Directive 2001/84, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32, 32 rec. 7, 8, 9 (EC) (“This
right is therefore a factor which contributes to the creation of distortions in competition as
well as displacement of sales within the Community.”).
60
See id.
61
Council Directive 2001/84, art. 2, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32, 35 (EC).
62
See id. art. 4, at 35. The directive allows for minimal wiggle room here, letting
member states choose the minimum price for which the right applies as long as it is
below €3,000. It also allows the member states to set the highest royalty rate at five
percent rather than four percent, but still sets the maximum royalty at €12,500. Id.
63
Id. art. 8, at 35; rec. 7, at 33.
64
Id. art. 6, at 35.
65
Id. art. 1, at 34.
66
Id. arts. 10, 12, at 36.
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allowed countries like the UK, which did not already have a law in
place to implement the Directive on a longer timeline.67
Accordingly, the UK did not fully implement the directive until
2012.68 Choosing to adhere to the longer deadlines, they applied
the law to living artists in 2006, and expanded it to their heirs in
2012.69
2. Legal Justifications for the Directive
In the recitals set forth before the directive’s adoption, the
European Union had articulated moral and legal justifications for
its enactment. First and foremost, the droit de suite directive is a
harmonization initiative.70 Recital 15 states:
In view of the scale of divergences between national
provisions it is therefore necessary to adopt
harmonising measures to deal with disparities
between the laws of the Member States in areas
where such disparities are liable to create or
maintain distorted conditions of competition. It is
not however necessary to harmonise every
provision of the Member States’ laws on the resale
right and, in order to leave as much scope for
national decision as possible, it is sufficient to limit
the harmonisation exercise to those domestic
provisions that have the most direct impact on the
functioning of the internal market.71
The recitals also cite article 95 of the European Community
Treaty as the legal basis for compelling member states to comply
with the measure.72 Article 95 empowers the European Council to
67

Id. at art. 8.
See Chanont Banternghansa & Kathryn Graddy, The Impact of the Droit de Suite in
the UK: An Empirical Analysis, Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper
No. DP7136, 5 (Jan. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1345662.
69
See id. at 3–5.
70
See Simon Stokes, Implementing the Artists’ Resale Right (droit de suite) Directive
into English Law, 13 ENT. L. R. 153, 153 (2002).
71
Council Directive 2001/84, rec. 15, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32, 33 (EC).
72
Id. rec. 10, at 32 (“Such disparities with regard to the existence of the resale right
and its application by the Member States have a direct negative impact on the proper
functioning of the internal market in works of art as provided for by Article 14 of the
68
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administer directives that would eliminate obstacles to free trade.73
Since the Council believes that the disparity between the art market
in the UK and in France is at least in part due to the UK’s lack of a
droit de suite, it felt justified in passing directive as a
harmonization measure. Whether droit de suite was actually a
barrier to trade, however, is questionable.74
A second legal justification for the directive is derived from
article 12 of the European Community Treaty, which states that
“all union citizens shall enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of
that Member State.”75 This suggests that a Member State that
offers a droit de suite to its citizens cannot bar EU citizens of other
Member States from benefitting from such a right—even if that
union citizen is from a nation that does not provide droit de suite.
Therefore, member states could not use non-reciprocity as a bar to
providing resale royalties, even though the Berne Convention
allows for such a bar.76 This justification would be equally
applicable to a directive that would eliminate droit de suite across
Europe, or one that allows states to keep their droit de suite
royalties at a level approximating the additional expenses of
exporting a work to a different country.77
3. Moral Justifications for the Directive
The fact that the European Council opted to harmonize their
laws by enacting a Union-wide droit de suite rather than

Treaty. In such a situation Article 95 of the Treaty constitutes the appropriate legal
basis.”).
73
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
95(1), May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 86 [hereinafter TFEU].
74
See Joerg Wuenschel, Article 95 EC Revisited: Is the Artist’s Resale Right Directive
a Community Act Beyond EC Competence?, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 130, 132–34
(2009). Wuenschel presents early data that indicates that London’s secondary market
dominance is not shifting to other European cities after harmonization. This suggests that
the barrier preventing Paris from matching the market in London is unrelated to droit de
suite. Id.
75
TFEU, supra note 73, at art. 12.
76
See Berne Convention, supra note 29 and accompanying text.
77
See David L. Booton, A Critical Analysis of the European Commission’s Proposal
for a Directive Harmonising the Droit de Suite, 1998 INTELL. PROP. Q. 165, 185 (1998).
This would minimize the threat of dealers exporting art out of a droit de suite country to
sell it in a non-droit de suite country just to save on the royalty.
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eliminating the right altogether, suggests that it accepted the moral
justifications for the original French droit de suite law. This is
evident in the directive’s reference to the inequities between artists
and other authors:
The resale right is intended to ensure that authors of
graphic and plastic works of art share in the
economic success of their original works of art. It
helps to redress the balance between the economic
situation of authors of graphic and plastic works of
art and that of other creators who benefit from
successive exploitations of their works.78
The fact that the European Council believes that visual artists
need greater economic protection suggests that the Council accepts
the myth of the starving artist as a valid concern in need of a
remedy.79 However, in the contemporary art market, established
artists can make lucrative amounts of money on primary market
sales and, accordingly, do not need greater economic protection.80
Therefore, the right must primarily be intended to protect those
young artists who have not yet established themselves in the art
world. But the value of art is in its uniqueness, whereas much of
the value in literature and music is in its reproducibility, and the
analogy between visual art and other creative works breaks down
when it is examined with some scrutiny, as is discussed below.81

78

Council Directive 2001/84, rec. 3, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32, 32 (EC).
See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text. Alternatively, this could simply
suggest that the European Council believes that all artists, regardless of their success
deserve increased protection. Such a conclusion should require justification under either
the labor theory of copyright, or the personhood theory of copyright, but both of these
theories fail to justify a droit de suite as discussed infra in Part III.B.
80
See Merryman, supra note 3, at 107, 109 (explaining that successful artists do not
starve and artistic genius does not go undiscovered).
81
See id. at 113–15 (addressing the argument that visual artists lack the opportunity to
collect royalties, in contrast to authors and composers, thus stressing the need for droit de
suite).
79
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II. DROIT DE SUITE IN PRACTICE
As of 2012, droit de suite has been fully enacted throughout the
entire European Union.82 Yet scholars such as Merryman and
others continue to argue that such a right is ineffective and
unnecessary.83 Now that droit de suite is in effect in London, one
of the major hubs of the contemporary art market, it will become
easier to examine exactly how droit de suite works in conjunction
with the contemporary art market.84 This section analyzes the
current understandings of the efficacy of enforcement, the
beneficiaries of the right, and the impact on markets in the UK and
the United States with an emphasis on the disagreements between
opponents and those who favor droit de suite.
A. Enforcement of the Directive
With full implementation of droit de suite now in effect in the
EU, it is necessary for each country to find a way to adequately
enforce the right. Administrative costs can be a great burden, so
most countries have collective management agencies that take the
royalties and deliver them to the artists after taking a fee.85 This
can potentially lead to issues with mismanagement and corruption.
In France, there are twenty-seven different authors’ societies that
collect droit de suite royalties.86 Victor Ginsburgh provides a
picture of how these collecting agencies are run:
The French copyright society SPADEM faced a
financial crisis in 1996 and was placed under courtordered administration. The Tribunal noted that its

82

See generally Council Directive 2001/84, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32 (EC).
See generally Merryman, supra note 3 (stating that supporters of droit de suite will
be “opposed by knowledgeable people who see the right as a textbook example of
uninformed good intentions in support of a bad cause”).
84
See Kawashima, supra note 42, at 237.
85
See Mara Grumbo, Accepting Droit De Suite As an Equal and Fair Measure Under
Intellectual Property Law and Contemplation of Its Implementation in the United States
Post Passage of the EU Directive, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 357, 362 (2008)
(discussing administrative costs of collecting royalties and the rates charged by various
collection agencies).
86
See Victor Ginsburgh, The Economic Consequences of Droit de Suite in the
European Union, 35 ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 61, 65 (2006) (discussing mismanagement
of the twenty-seven French authors’ societies).
83
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running costs, in particular staff salaries, could only
be paid if the money, which should be used to pay
artists’ dues, was drawn on. ADAMI, another
French authors’ society audited by the French
Ministry of Finance, did not pay the royalties due to
Sean Connery, Charles Bronson and Laura
Antonelli because “it could not find their
addresses.” ADAMI also used money earmarked to
promote artistic creation, to renovate its offices.
SACEM, another French society, needs 1,490
employees to manage the accounts of 12,000
members . . . . The Danish society in charge of
[droit de suite] takes as much as 40% of the
royalty . . . . ADAGP, the French collecting agency,
levies 20% before paying artists.87
According to Ginsburgh, this data is nothing short of
appalling.88 That is not to say, however, that enforcement is a total
failure—the collecting agencies have been successful in keeping
auction houses accountable, much like ASCAP and BMI have been
successful in enforcing the rights of recording artists and
composers in the United States.89 In 1990, over $17 million in
royalties were collected and distributed to over 1,700 artists in
France alone.90 Furthermore, collecting agencies tend to provide
benefits to the art community beyond collecting and distributing
royalties.91 For example, they are involved in lobbying for artists’

87

Id. at 65.
See Ginsburgh, supra note 86, at 65 (referring to mismanagement of French authors’
societies as “frightening” and “wasteful”).
89
See Reddy, supra note 16, at 516–17 (noting that “the resale royalty is in reality only
collected at auction” and that the French authors’ societies are “similar to ASCAP and
BMI”).
90
Id. at 531 (“Jean-Marc Gutton, General Manager of ADAGP, testified that more
than $17,000,000 in resale royalties were collected and distributed to more than 1700
artists in 1990.”).
91
See Eliza Hall, The French Exception: Why the Resale Royalty Works in France and
Why it Matters to the U.S., 1 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 321, 335–37 (2007) (“[T]hese
organizations [also] function as a means of sharing the wealth generated by the music
industry, providing benefits to less-successful artists that are funded by the successful
artists’ royalties.”).
88
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rights and they often provide grants for artists.92 Outside of
France, however, there are not many success stories.93
The EU Directive mitigates administrative costs by setting a
minimum sale price for which royalties may be applied.94
Unfortunately, however, the cost of enforcement has still been
fairly significant. In a 2008 study of droit de suite in the UK, Toby
Frauschauer concluded that the administrative cost of droit de suite
is between €23.30 and €53.60 per sale (significantly greater than
supporters’ prediction that costs would be €0.50 per sale).95
Opponents of droit de suite cite the inefficiencies of enforcing
droit de suite as a reason that the right should not exist.96 But
proponents argue that poorly designed statutes create these
inefficiencies, which can be ameliorated by implementing simpler
collection requirements like those in France.97 Unfortunately, it
will be several years before any reliable data on the efficacy of
droit de suite in a major contemporary art hub like London will
exist.
B. Who Benefits from Droit de Suite
Until very recently, there was little to no concrete data on who
would actually benefit from droit de suite. While the European
Commission was first considering a droit de suite directive, some
opponents suggested that it would only benefit the eight richest
artists and their estates, but proponents argued it would actually
92

See id. (stating that “members of ASCAP and BMI . . . benefit from litigation and
lobbying efforts whose cost would be beyond the means of the overwhelming majority of
musicians and composers” and that in 2004 ASCAP put collected royalties toward grants
for emerging songwriters).
93
See Merryman, supra note 3, at 115 (observing that of the twenty-nine jurisdictions
that recognize the droit de suite right, twenty-four apply it “little or not at all”).
94
Council Directive 2001/84, rec. 22, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32, 34 (EC) (stating that
“minimum threshold may help to avoid disproportionately high collection and
administration costs”).
95
See TOBY FROSCHAUER, THE IMPACT OF ARTIST RESALE RIGHTS ON THE ART
MARKET IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 10 (2008) (“[A]uctioneers’ calculation of the
transaction costs ranged between £23.30 and £53.60, depending on whether or not they
had included set-up costs.”).
96
See Merryman, supra note 3, at 115 (explaining that one of the primary arguments
against droit de suite is that it doesn’t work and most jurisdictions do not enforce it).
97
See PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 16, at 106.
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benefit closer to 250,000 artists in Europe alone.98 However, a
study performed in 2005 suggests that between the years 2000 and
2004 only 3,876 living artists had work sold at auction
worldwide.99 During the same timeframe, the work of just slightly
fewer than 10,000 deceased artists was sold at auction.100 It is
important to note that these data do not account for private dealer
sales outside of the realm of auctions, which are still subject to
droit de suite. Still, the numbers are drastically lower than the
estimate calculating that 250,000 artists would benefit.
Besides being limited to a smaller number of individuals than
was originally expected, the lion’s share of droit de suite benefits
are concentrated distinctly among a select few artists and estates.
Overall, heirs of deceased artists receive around eighty-five
percent of droit de suite royalties.101 In France, four deceased
artists—Picasso, Braque, Matisse, and Leger (none of which were
starving artists)—account for close to seventy percent of all droit
de suite royalties.102 Opponents of droit de suite suggest that any
right that so disproportionately benefits wealthy creators is
undesirable.103 Proponents counter by arguing that “it would be
unreasonable to expect all fine artists to forfeit this potentially
lucrative reward simply because, as in any other enterprise, those
who have the greatest success will benefit the most.”104 That the
wealthiest artist will benefit the most is merely a “fact of life.”105
Even very small royalty payments would be beneficial to artists
who are struggling to make ends meet through their primary
market sales.106
98
See European Commission, Proposed Directive on Artists’ Resale Right—
Clarification MEMO/99/68, 14 December 1999, 1 (“Within the EU as a whole,
approximately 250,000 artists would benefit from the resale right. Any suggestion that
the resale right would benefit only eight rich families (e.g. Picasso’s heirs) is therefore
inaccurate.”).
99
Ginsburgh, supra note 86, at 66.
100
Id. (“The work of 9,987 deceased artists was sold during the same period.”).
101
Id. at 66.
102
M. Franklin Boyd, Presentation on Artists’ Resale Royalty Rights (Mar. 6, 2012)
(slides on file with author).
103
See Merryman, supra note 3, at 117.
104
Reddy, supra note 16, at 531.
105
Id.
106
See id.
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C. Impact in the UK
Because its strong contemporary art market dwarfs those of the
rest of Europe, the United Kingdom was one of the strongest
opponents to passing the EU droit de suite directive and the most
stubborn when it came time to implement it.107 The United
Kingdom was concerned that droit de suite would harm the art
market and send auction sales to countries without droit de suite,
such as the United States and Switzerland. However, one recent
empirical study suggests droit de suite has not had a significant
impact on auction sales:
The worst predictions regarding the effect on the
UK art market from the implementation of the [droit
de suite] have not been realized. We have not seen
a reduction in price growth for art subject to the
[droit de suite] in the UK relative to other countries
or other markets and we have not found evidence of
a movement of paintings from the UK to other
venues where the [droit de suite] would not be
applied.108
This report suggests that implementing droit de suite has
actually had little effect on European trade.109 However, the report
also suggests that once droit de suite is expanded to the heirs of
deceased artists, “it may become harder for buyers to ignore the
impact and the [droit de suite] may increasingly be factored into
their valuations,” leading to a potential drop in prices of up to
twenty-four percent.110 Although this report suggests there has not
been a shift in locations of sales, there is anecdotal evidence to the
contrary. For example, in 2001, UNICEF sold the £50,000,000

107
The UK implemented droit de suite for living artists in 2006, and did not provide the
right to heirs of deceased artists until 2012. See Daniel Grant, “Droit de Suite” Debate
Heats Up, ARTNEWS, Jan. 11, 2012, available at http://www.artnews.com/2012/01/11/
droit-de-suite-debate-heats-up.
108
Banternghansa & Graddy, supra note 68, at 33.
109
See id. This also suggests that unharmonized droit de suite laws never were an
actual barrier to free trade and the harmonization element of the EC’s droit de suite
directive was therefore entirely unnecessary. It is important to note, though, that this
does not mean that droit de suite has not had an impact on the primary art market.
110
Id. at 34.
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Gaffé collection in New York rather than France specifically so
that it could avoid the droit de suite fee.111
The impact of droit de suite might not be limited to auction
sales. The interdependence of primary market sales and secondary
market112 sales means that the primary market should also expect
to see changes with the implementation of droit de suite. One
recent economic model suggests that the new droit de suite in the
UK will result in less art being made.113 Under this model, droit de
suite does encourage production of art among well-established
artists later in their career, but only at the expense of young artists
and art consumers.114 But droit de suite proponents argue that
these models assume that collectors only buy art for investment
purposes, whereas many collectors buy art purely for its aesthetic
appeal.115
D. Droit de Suite in the United States
Despite multiple attempts at passing federal and state droit de
suite legislation, the right has never been effectively enforced in
the United States. Until recently, California was the only U.S.
state with a resale royalty right.116 The California statute closely
mirrored the EU Directive, but with a simpler, flat, uncapped
royalty of five percent on all secondary sales of “fine art.”117 In
May 2012, however, a California trial court ruled that the droit de
suite directive violated the dormant commerce clause of the U.S.
Constitution by applying outside the state of California in certain
instances.118 Despite the fact that the statute includes a severability
clause, the court ruled that the portion of the statute that applies
beyond the state’s borders could not be severed and the entire

111

Ginsburgh, supra note 86, at 68.
See supra notes 52–59 and accompanying text.
113
See Gyu Ho Wang, The Resale Royalty Right and its Economic Effects, 15 J. OF
ECON. RESEARCH 171, 181 (2010).
114
See id. (“[T]he resale royalty right has a harmful effect on both the consumer surplus
and the social welfare.”).
115
See Reddy, supra note 16, at 529.
116
See supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text.
117
See Cal. Civ. Code § 986 (West 2012), invalidated by Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s
Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
118
See Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
112
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statute was declared invalid.119 Pending appeal, this means there is
no longer any droit de suite in the United States.
Besides violating the dormant commerce clause, the California
statute has a number of other issues that some scholars suggest
would make it invalid or at least ineffective even if an appeal were
to successfully reverse the unseverability decision. First of all, the
statute seems to be preempted by federal copyright law.120 The
Copyright Act of 1976 states that any right that falls within the
general scope of copyright law is preempted by the Act.121 While
it is not clear that a droit de suite would fall within the general
scope of copyright law, the fact that Congress considered including
the right in the Visual Artists’ Rights Act (which is encoded as part
of the Copyright Act),122 suggests that it might be. The California
law has previously withstood preemption scrutiny,123 but only
under the Copyright Act of 1909, which did not include a
preemption clause as the current act does.124
Secondly, even if the California droit de suite were
constitutional, it would be very difficult to enforce. The statute
requires that in the event of a reseller’s failure to comply with the
law, an artist must bring a suit himself125—something most artists
cannot afford to do. Furthermore, various privacy interests of
buyers interfere with the application of the statute.126 Auction
houses are notoriously secretive about buyers and sellers of fine art

119

See id. at 1126.
Anandashankar Mazumdar, Two Lawsuits by Artists May Test Validity of California
Resale Royalty Rights Statute, UCIRA, http://www.ucira.ucsb.edu/two-lawsuits-byartists-may-test-validity-of-california-resale-royalty-rights-statute (last visited June 15,
2012).
121
17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
122
See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 608(b), 80 Stat.
5089 (1990).
123
See generally Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1980) (This case was
brought by an art dealer arguing that the California Resale Royalty Act was preempted by
the 1909 Copyright Act.).
124
See id.
125
Cal. Civ. Code § 986(a)(3) (West 2012), invalidated by Estate of Graham v.
Sotheby’s Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
126
See generally Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s Inc., 860 F.Supp.2d 1117 (CD Cal.
2012); Francis Foundation v. Christie’s Inc. No. 2:11-cv-08605-SVW-PJW (C.D. Cal.
filed Oct. 18, 2011).
120
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so it is difficult for artists to know when their works are being sold
by California residents (as is evidenced by a pair of lawsuits filed
in California in 2011).127 As a result, this droit de suite statute has
generally been ineffective in the past.
In sum, because of the perceived high cost of enforcement and
the skewed royalty payments that favor wealthy artists, many
scholars and other opponents such as museums, dealers, and some
artists argue against further implementation of droit de suite.
However, proponents of the right, including established artists like
Robert Rauschenberg, believe that droit de suite is favorable
because the artist’s own genius and reputation is the most direct
cause of an increase in the value of a work sold at auction, and
therefore, the artist deserves to share in that windfall.128 This
argument, coupled with anecdotes about artists such as Millet and
Rauschenberg, and the desire to correct the imbalance between the
economic rights in the creative work of visual artists and other
authors has been sufficient to keep droit de suite expanding over
the last decade. Yet as legislators and established artists continue
to push for more droit de suite legislation throughout the world,
scholars continue to disagree on the appeal of the right. I attempt
to resolve this conflict in the next section not only through a
careful analysis of policy considerations, but also a review of
copyright justification theories, which until now have not been
included in droit de suite discussions.
III. DROIT DE SUITE CONFLICTS WITH COMMON LAW POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS AND FAILS TO COMPLY WITH COPYRIGHT THEORY
With the full implementation of droit de suite in the UK, there
is now strong international pressure to expand the right globally.129
The U.S. Copyright Office suggested reconsidering droit de suite if

127

See Mazumdar, supra note 120.
See Merryman, supra note 3, at 111.
129
See Victoria Till, Defeated or Deferred? Why a Resale Royalty was Rejected in
Australia, 13 INT’L J. CULTURAL POL’Y 287, 289 (2007) (quoting the English House of
Commons report stating “[T]he Government should renew its efforts to achieve universal
adoption of droit de suite, through all available international channels”).
128

C06_BUSSEY (DO NOT DELETE)

1086

4/17/2013 3:46 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:1063

Europe implemented the right,130 and, accordingly, the House and
Senate have each proposed bills that, if passed, would implement
droit de suite in the United States.131 Furthermore, in late 2011,
artists in California finally started using the judicial system to fight
the auction houses that were not paying out royalties in accordance
with that state’s droit de suite.132 The demise of the California
statute that resulted from those 2011 lawsuits could potentially
bring about louder cries for a federal law by droit de suite
proponents. It seems that pressure to expand droit de suite is
building and could lead to a possibility of further implementation
across the globe.133 But common law nations such as the United
States should resist this pressure because a number of policy
considerations weigh heavily against further implementation, and
because such a law lacks a basis in copyright theory.
A. Policy Considerations Weigh Against Further Droit de Suite
Implementation
Besides the fact that droit de suite cannot sit comfortably
within any traditional justification for intellectual property rights,
as will be discussed below, simple policy considerations weigh
against it. For example, the resale royalty right is based on an
archaic art market and unproven mythology, it contradicts the
utilitarian ideals used as the basis for copyright in most common
law nations, it contradicts notions of property law, and it relies on a
false assumption that artists are naïve and easily taken advantage
of. In addition to being an administrative burden, its benefits
simply would not outweigh its costs.
1. The Art Market Has Changed Since France Originally
Implemented Droit de Suite
Since the European Council chose to compel member nations
to enact droit de suite laws, it seemingly accepted the original
moral justification France adhered to when passing it in 1920.
130

See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. REG. OF COPYRIGHTS, DROIT DE SUITE: THE ARTIST’S
RESALE ROYALTY 149 (1992).
131
See S. 2000, 122th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); H.R. 3688, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
132
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
133
See Till, supra note 129, at 289.
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Therefore, one can surmise that the starving artist/greedy dealer
myth—Jean-Francois Millet’s family starving while his painting
Angelus was sold for one million francs by his dealer134—was
accepted by the Council as a moral justification for the directive
(though this justification was likely secondary to the political
demands of France’s secondary art market and the collective
management organizations who enforce and benefit from droit de
suite laws).
The reality of the myth of the starving artist is itself
questionable. Even in the early twentieth century when droit de
suite was initially gaining support, poor artists like Van Gogh and
Gauguin were the exception, not the rule.135 In fact, many of the
best artists earned considerable wealth from their art during their
lives.136 Today, an average artist earns an income comparable to
an average worker—artists are by and large not starving.137 In
fact, artists consistently earn more than other authors such as poets
or playwrights.138
Once the myth of the starving artist is shattered, it is clear that
visual artists are no more deserving of additional intellectual
property protections than any other creator. It makes little sense to
analogize artists to recording artists and writers who make money
from the royalties on the reproduction of their work. Artists make
money on the sale of chattels. The value in visual art is in the
unique quality of each piece. Each individual piece of art can only
be “consumed” by a single owner at a time, whereas a writer’s
novel, for example, can be reproduced and sold to thousands of
readers at once at marginally low costs.
134

See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
See BRUNO S. FREY, ART & ECONOMICS: ANALYSIS & CULTURAL POLICY 30 (2d ed.
2003).
136
See id. (citing as examples such artists as Rubens, Tiziano, Rembrandt, Lenbach,
Stuck, Picasso, and Beuys).
137
See Elliott C. Alderman, Resale Royalties in the United States for Fine Visual
Artists: An Alien Concept, 40 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 265, 281 (1992). It may
warrant noting, however, that many artists are forced to work second jobs in addition to
making art because it is difficult to make sales. Furthermore, many artists struggle to get
paid by their gallerists, even when they have successful exhibitions, due to poorly
managed galleries or questionable business practices.
138
See Stephen E. Weil, Resale Royalties: Nobody Benefits, ARTNEWS, Mar. 1978, at
59.
135
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Even among visual artists, the resale royalty is unevenly
applied—as video artists and performance artists often live off
grant money because their work cannot be sold, they would not
benefit at all from resale royalties. But the work produced by these
artists can be just as culturally significant as paintings and
sculptures. If traditional artists are worthy of additional copyrightrelated protection, then so are these artists, but droit de suite fails
to provide such protection.
Finally, today’s art market is vastly different from that of early
twentieth century France. Dealers now work on consignment
rather than by attempting to “take advantage” of poor artists.139 So
contemporary art galleries set fair prices and artists receive market
value for their work.
Furthermore, artists are not solely
responsible for their own success. Without gallery representation
and a dealer’s investments in their careers, artists have little hope
of ever making a profit on their work. And when an artist retains a
resale royalty right in each piece of art he sells, then buyers are
likely to demand a discount on the original sale, reducing the profit
for both the artist and the dealer. Therefore, awarding a royalty
solely to artists hurts the dealers that put the artists in a position to
profit at auction in the first place.
2. Droit de Suite Contradicts Common Law Copyright
Doctrine and Property Rights
As will be discussed below, droit de suite fails to completely
satisfy the traditional theories used to justify copyright.140 Droit de
suite fits more in line with the civil law personhood theory of
copyright, if it fits within any theory at all. Utilitarianism, the
theory most prevalent in common law nations, is based on the idea
that copyright protection exists to incentivize authors to create
culturally significant works.141 But droit de suite does not
incentivize creation of work; it might even stifle creation.142

139

See Merryman, supra note 3.
See infra Part III.B.
141
See Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author
Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 1, 9–13 (1994) (explaining that U.S. copyright law treats copyright rights like
140
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Furthermore, droit de suite contradicts the well-established first
sale doctrine, which extinguishes an author’s right in a particular
copy of a creative work once it is sold.143 This doctrine is meant to
prevent copyright protection from interfering with common law
property rights—specifically, the free alienability of property.144 A
droit de suite would put a restriction on alienability. Such
restrictions have been highly frowned upon by Anglo-American
courts for centuries.145 If legislators want to provide extra
economic protections to one profession such as visual artists, they
must consider what sets them apart from other producers. Should
the royalty be extended to architects each time a building he
designs is resold, or makers of furniture and other utilitarian
design? Should a royalty be paid to a winery when its rare wine is
sold at auction? And what about used car sales? Surely an
automotive designer is proud of the creative work she puts into the
car model she designs, but nobody would suggest that she deserves
to be compensated each time the car is resold at a used car lot.146
None of these craftsmen receive resale royalties because such a
device would be a restriction on alienability, and free alienability is
necessary to promote the most efficient use of property.147
The manner in which art is consumed is more closely related to
these goods than to literature or music, so there is no reason to
conflate the value of art’s intellectual property with the value of its
physical property in order to create additional financial benefits
only for visual artists. Doing so would be inconsistent with wellaccepted common law property doctrine.
commodities and that alienability is necessary to reap the monetary rewards of
intellectual labor).
142
See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text.
143
See Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 141–
42 (1998) (discussing Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908) (holding that
copyright cannot be extended beyond the first sale of a copy so as to place a restriction on
subsequent alienations of the copy)).
144
See id.
145
See Glen O. Robinson, Explaining Contingent Rights: The Puzzle of “Obsolete”
Covenants, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 546, 568 (1991).
146
Some commentators suggest the right would be good for the sale of used CDs and
DVDs. See Ken Lovern, Evaluating Resale Royalties for Used CDs, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 113 (1994).
147
See id.
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3. Droit de Suite Wrongly Assumes Artists Cannot Protect
Themselves
The unwaiveability and inalienability of droit de suite assumes
artists are so naïve that they cannot bargain away their rights for
value.
All other economic intellectual property rights are
assignable or waiveable because this gives authors bargaining
power and maximizes an author’s opportunities for income.148 But
droit de suite is traditionally unwaiveable and inalienable.
Proponents of droit de suite suggest that this is necessary because
of the unequal bargaining power between young artists and
buyers.149 But this viewpoint is based on an archaic understanding
of the art market. Since the relationship between artists and
dealers is now more symbiotic than predatory, artists have
significantly greater bargaining power than they did in the early
twentieth century.150
In practice, the unwaiveability and inalienability of droit de
suite acts as a forced investment. Consider the following likely
scenario: a buyer who knows he retains less than 100% of a work’s
future resale value will perceive the current value of a work to be
lower than if he were to retain the entire future resale value. That
buyer will then pay less for the work that he values less.
Theoretically, the artist can make up this difference if that work is
ever resold for a profit on the secondary market—but the
likelihood of any given work being resold on the secondary market
is quite low. An unwaiveable droit de suite, then, essentially
forces an artist to forego income on a first sale based on the
speculation that his work will later increase in value and sell on the
secondary market. But the young artist would realize a greater
benefit from a higher sale price earlier in his career—when sales
may not be as easy to come by—than he would from royalties later
in his career when he is already successful. Moreover, if the work
is never resold, the artist will never make that money back.

148
149
150

See Netanel, supra note 141.
See Merryman, supra note 3, at 123.
See supra notes 51–56 and accompanying text.
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Artists are not so naïve. In fact, some European artists who
have the resale royalty right would rather it didn’t exist.151
Currently, in the United States, an artist can choose to include a
resale royalty in his contract of sale or he can choose to leave it
out, but with an unwaiveable droit de suite right in place, that artist
could not sell 100% of the property interest in his work even if he
wanted to.
4. Droit de Suite Primarily Benefits Those Who do not Need
Additional Economic Protection
At bottom, droit de suite simply fails to improve upon the
issues it was originally designed to address. After the collective
agencies take their cut, most artists receive very little, if
anything.152 And the artists that truly benefit from the right are the
ones who need it the least.153 Secondary market sales are rare for
an average artist, and not to be expected until late in the artist’s
career.154 Proponents of the right argue that “[e]ven a royalty of
fifty dollars may allow an artist to purchase supplies sufficient to
create her next work of art—or to pay the electric bill, allowing her
to continue to create rather than devoting all her time and energy to
finding another job.”155 The problem with this argument is that
those artists who are devoting all their time to finding another job
because they are not making sales on the primary market will not
receive any royalty as there is no secondary market for
unsuccessful artists. By the time an artist is successful enough to
have her work sold on the secondary market she is likely making
enough on primary sales to live quite comfortably. Droit de suite
threatens to take money out of the pockets of young aspiring artists

151

See Patricia Cohen, Artists File Lawsuit, Seeking Royalties, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1,
2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/arts/design/artists-file-suitagainst-sothebys-christies-and-ebay.html?pagewanted=1&_r=3 (“The arrival of [droit de
suite] will do little or nothing for the vast majority of British artists. It will undoubtedly
envelop the market, on which we as artists depend, in red tape, and it will discourage art
dealers from buying particularly the work of emerging artists.”).
152
See supra notes 86–95 and accompanying text.
153
See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text.
154
See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
155
Shira Perlmutter, Resale Royalties for Artists: An Analysis of the Register of
Copyrights’ Report, 40 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 284 (1993).
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when they need it most, and that is the opposite result lawmakers
likely hope for.156
B. Droit de Suite Under Three Theories of Copyright
Despite the policy considerations that weigh heavily against
droit de suite, the resale royalty right has gained increasing
acceptance since the 1960s. In previous scholarship, the policy
debate is where the droit de suite discussion ended. An analysis of
copyright theory and its relation to droit de suite should strengthen
the opposition to the unsuccessful right.
While France’s system of copyright is based on a personality
theory,157 the United States and other common law nations have
traditionally justified copyright law with a utilitarian rationale.158
Both of these systems of copyright have evolved over the years,
however, and scholars now recognize that a mix of utilitarian
theory and personality theory, as well as Lockean labor theory,
justifies most copyright regimes.
A comprehensive awareness of how an intellectual property
right fits within these theories aids lawmakers’ ability to effect
better intellectual property policy.159 This section will briefly
discuss each of the three most widely accepted theories of
copyright and analyze droit de suite under each in order to show
that lawmakers should resist creating droit de suite rights in nations
that do not already have them.

156
Assuming the original justification for the French droit de suite of providing
additional income to poor artists is still the goal of the law, lawmakers would prefer to
see young aspiring artists benefit over wealthy established artists.
157
See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
158
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts”).
159
William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 169, 194 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001). Fisher
describes how an analysis of intellectual property theory as it relates to the right of
publicity has shown that the right of publicity is difficult to justify. As a result, what was
once “a self-evident legal right, needing little intellectual rationalization to justify its
existence” is now a significantly weakened right that is not as widely accepted. Id. at 195
(quoting J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 1.1[B][2], at 1–5
(1992)).
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1. Personality Theory
Personality theory is based largely on the philosophy of Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.160 Margaret Jane Radin has more
recently tailored Hegel’s philosophy to the context of intellectual
property.161 Simply put, this theory suggests that an artist should
own intellectual property in her creation because the work is an
extension of the artist’s self.162 Hegel writes that “[a]ttainments,
eruditions, talents, and so forth, are, of course, owned by free mind
and are something internal and not external to it, but even so, by
expressing them it may embody them in something external and
alienate them.”163 That is, expressions of the mind become
property outside of the mind even though they might not be
tangible “things.”164 Control of intellectual property in one’s work
is necessary “for self-actualization, for personal expression, and for
dignity and recognition as an individual person.”165 Creation, and
more importantly, ownership in what is created, is therefore a
fundamental element of humanity and necessary for flourishing in
life.
Unlike other theories, which try to equate intellectual property
with tangible property, personality theory treats the two differently.
Thus, the breadth of one’s exclusive control over intellectual
property under this theory may differ from that exercised over
property such as land or chattels. In fact, Hegel himself disfavored
exclusive control over tangible property but saw intellectual
property as much more personal and therefore much more
deserving of strong protection than real property.166
Personality theory also differs from other theories of copyright
in that it does not focus on the financial fruit of intellectual
160

See generally G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford
University Press 1967) (1821).
161
See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957
(1982).
162
See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 330–
34 (1988).
163
HEGEL, supra note 160, at ¶ 43.
164
Id.
165
Hughes, supra note 162, at 330.
166
See id. at 334; see also id. at 348 (explaining that Hegel disfavored alienation of
intellectual property rights, considering it to be morally analogous to slavery or suicide).
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property. Instead, personality theory puts high value on moral
rights such as recognition of a creator and maintaining the integrity
of the work. Monetary gains from intellectual property are merely
secondary, as Professor Justin Hughes explains: “[f]rom the
Hegelian perspective, payments from intellectual property users to
the property creator are acts of recognition [that] acknowledge the
individual’s claim over the property, and it is through such
acknowledgement that an individual is recognized by others as a
person.”167 Hughes goes on to state that “[e]ven for starving
artists, recognition of this sort [respect, honor, and admiration]
may be far more valuable than economic rewards.”168
This is the theory of copyright under which droit de suite was
born, and it is the theory in which droit de suite sits most
comfortably. Under other theories of property and intellectual
property, one may encounter opposition when attempting to collect
a royalty on the resale of an object that has already been sold
outright, but under personality theory, the idea that the object is an
extension of the creator’s identity holds some weight.
But personality theory does not require that resellers go so far
as to pay the artist a second time for the artist’s work—the theory
is more concerned with moral rights such as ensuring that resellers
properly acknowledge the creator. Receipt of monetary payment
has only a very minor and indirect effect on the development of
one’s personality.169 Since droit de suite looks more like an
economic right than a moral one, it is difficult to justify it under a
theory that gives little appreciation to the monetary value of
intellectual property.170 This highlights a primary reason why
many scholars are uncomfortable with accepting and promoting
droit de suite (besides the fact that it is unlikely to work in
practice)—it is an economic right founded on the principles of
moral rights. This schizophrenia feels misplaced under whichever
theory of copyright one may advocate. Furthermore, the monetary
payment does nothing to protect the integrity of the artist’s work,
and although it can be seen as an acknowledgement of the identity
167
168
169
170

Id. at 349 (citing HEGEL, supra note 160, at ¶ 71).
Id. at 350.
See id. at 349.
See id.
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of the creator of the work, the caption in the auction house’s
catalog listing the artist’s name is a simpler and more effective
form of acknowledgment.
At bottom, the droit de suite does little to promote the goals of
the personality theory of copyright. When a painting or other form
of visual art is sold on the secondary market, the painting is valued
because the work’s integrity has been maintained and its creator is
correctly identified—the sale alone (assuming it is a successful
sale) promotes the dignity and recognition of the artist, with or
without a pecuniary payment. To be fair, a royalty on that sale
does nothing to harm the painter’s personality, but due to its
economic nature, it would be better to find justification elsewhere.
2. Utilitarian Theory
Utilitarian theory is the original basis for the progress clause in
the U.S. Constitution,171 and has been embraced by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Fox Film Corp v. Doyal.172 Under
this theory, intellectual property rights are meant to maximize
economic wealth by incentivizing the progress of science and
useful arts. This incentive comes in the form of exclusivity, which
gives the author an opportunity to exploit her own work without
worrying about others trying to piggyback on her creativity. Judge
Richard Posner and Professor William Landes explain that:
[a] distinguishing characteristic of intellectual
property is its ‘public good’ aspect. While the cost
of creating a work subject to copyright
protection . . . is often high, the cost of reproducing
the work, whether by the creator or by those to
whom he has made it available, is often low. . . .
Copyright protection . . . trades off the costs of
limiting access to a work against the benefits of
providing incentives to create the work in the first
place. . . . For copyright law to promote economic
171

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts”).
172
286 U.S. 123, 127–28 (1932) (“A copyright, like a patent, is ‘at once the equivalent
given by the public for benefits bestowed by the genius and meditations and skill of
individuals, and the incentive to further efforts for the same important objects.’”).
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efficiency, its principal legal doctrines must, at least
approximately, maximize the benefits from creating
additional works minus both the losses from
limiting access and the costs of administering
copyright protection.173
This is the foundation of utilitarian copyright theory.
Copyright protection is meant to offset the “cost of expression.”174
Without some exclusivity, the author would be unable to afford to
create the work in the first place—and therefore would create
nothing.175
This theory requires a certain balancing act. Although greater
protection is meant to create greater incentive for creation, it may
also cause the price of works to increase, which could actually chill
progress instead of promoting it.176 Likewise, greater copyright
protection decreases the value of copies of intellectual products
because the buyer is restricted from using them in certain ways.
To justify droit de suite under the utilitarian theory, one must
show that it encourages artists to create art and to move art
forward. But evidence suggests it does the exact opposite—by
cutting into the potential profits that can be realized on the
secondary market, droit de suite theoretically drives down the
primary market price of work created by young artists on the
primary market and acts as a disincentive to create work.177
Therefore, droit de suite disturbs the balancing act between rights
of authors and rights of consumers, and as a result, it is difficult to
justify droit de suite under the utilitarian theory.
Of course, it is not fair to ignore the evidence that suggests that
a select few more established artists are likely to create more work
as a result of droit de suite.178 But the fact remains that the total
amount of art expected to be produced with a droit de suite is less
173

William J. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law,
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989).
174
Id. at 327.
175
See Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values
in Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841, 854 (1993).
176
See Fisher, supra note 159.
177
See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text.
178
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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than the total amount of art expected to be produced without it.179
Furthermore, work by established artists is less likely to promote
the progress of visual art than the work of young artists.180 So
even if droit de suite encourages creation and increases financial
gain for some, it still fails to incentivize progress in art overall
because it discourages creation for many.181
Proponents of droit de suite argue that a conclusion that the
right would depress the prices of primary market sales is based on
a model that assumes art buyers only buy art as an investment.182
But since many art collectors purchase art for its aesthetic appeal,
and not for its investment value, a droit de suite should not impact
primary market prices. However, this argument fails to recognize
that even if most collectors buy for aesthetic appeal, they are still
mostly shrewd businessmen. Whether or not the purchase is for
investment purposes, a buyer is going to try to get the best price,
and even the least sophisticated buyers can understand that partial
ownership of a piece of art is not worth as much as full ownership
of a piece of art. Accordingly, it is reasonable to accept the
aforementioned economic model’s conclusions regardless of why
people buy art.
Additionally, droit de suite was conceived as a way to correct
the lack of benefits artists received from copyright protection.183
But artists may not even need such benefits because the market for
179

See id.
While it is difficult to say exactly what constitutes progress in visual art, we can be
sure that stasis is not progress. Artists who have established themselves successfully
enough to have a secondary market for their work are likely to continue to make more
work similar to what made them successful and then eventually stop making work as they
age. This pattern looks more like stasis than progress. In the fields of science and
technology, progress is generally accepted as innovation, this is why patents require
novelty. Likewise, in visual art, progress requires innovation, or a development of new
expressions that build upon old ones. Most art galleries and dealers invest much of their
efforts in discovering new artists with new ideas and new ways of thinking about art
because these are the artists who move the industry forward. For one discussion of
progress in art, see generally Henry F. Gilbert, Progress in Art, 6 THE MUSICAL Q. 159
(1920).
181
This statement is based only on economic models that may not, in fact, represent
true behavior in the real world, but utilitarian copyright theory depends entirely on such
economic models.
182
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
183
See supra notes 21–32 and accompanying text.
180
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artwork differs from the market for easily copied intellectual
products like books and music recordings.184 That is, copying a
book or a recording takes no creative talent or skill, and the
process can be digitally automated, so these products are easily
reproduced and distributed en masse, but copying a painting or
sculpture requires the copyist to possess a certain degree of
technique (though it does not require creativity).185 As a result,
legal copies of literary and musical works sell for very little while
original paintings sell for very high prices. So the exclusivity of
copyright protection is not likely a necessary incentive for a visual
artist to create work. Similarly, increasing copyright protection by
creating a resale royalty right is also unnecessary to incentivize the
creation of art. Droit de suite therefore fails to fit within the
bounds of utilitarian theory.
3. Labor Theory
Labor theory is based on the work of John Locke.186 Locke
suggests that property rights are derived from one’s labor. The
traditional interpretation187 of Locke’s theory states that since each
individual at a minimum owns himself and his labor, therefore he
also owns the fruit of his labor—that is, anything which he takes
out of “the commons” (all that is in the world prior to being
improved upon) and improves upon through his labor.188 Rather
than focusing on incentives to maximize wealth as under the
utilitarian theory, the Labor theory suggests that an individual
deserves to own the fruit of his labor—whether or not the
ownership encourages progress of any kind.189 Applied to
184

See supra Part III.A.1.
In Bridgeman Art Library Ltd. v. Corel Corp, 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (S.D.N.Y.
1999), the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York explained
that technical skill and effort required for slavishly copying a work of art do not amount
to the “creative spark” required for copyright protection.
186
See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1689); see also
Hughes, supra note 162, at 296.
187
For another view, see generally Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments for
Private Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF
PROPERTY 138 (Stephen R. Munzer, ed., 2001).
188
See LOCKE, supra note 186, at 2d treatise, § 85; see also Hughes, supra note 162, at
297.
189
See Hughes, supra note 162, at 298.
185
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intellectual property, this theory suggests that an author should
have exclusive ownership of creative expressions, which are
improvements on unexpressed ideas found in “the commons.”
An alternative understanding of Locke’s labor theory, however,
suggests that Locke’s labor theory does not apply so easily to
intellectual property.190 For instance, Seana Shiffrin argues that
Locke only endorsed private ownership if “things of that sort [are]
susceptible to justified private ownership,”191 and some of Locke’s
writings indicate that he opposed intellectual property rights
because they are not the sort of things that ought to be owned
privately.192
Whether or not Locke approved of intellectual property may be
irrelevant, though, as labor theory has evolved beyond Locke’s
writings, and it is generally accepted as one possible justification
for intellectual property.193 Instead of focusing on whether Locke
approved of such rights himself, one should ask why “labor upon a
resource ‘in common’ entitle[s] the laborer to a property right in
the resource itself?”194 Fisher suggests that Locke provided a
number of answers to such a question—some of which would
provide strong support for intellectual property rights, and some of
which would not.195 This section adopts the traditional viewpoint
that intellectual property can be justified by labor theory, but
acknowledges that such a viewpoint may not be the strongest
understanding of Locke’s treatises.
Much like utilitarian theory, Locke’s labor theory recognizes
the balancing act between the property rights of the creator and the
rights of others. The theory sets two provisos on ownership of
190

See generally Shiffrin, supra note 187 (interpreting Locke’s theory of private
appropriation as not endorsing appropriation of most intellectual products).
191
See id. at 143.
192
See id. at 154.
193
See Fisher, supra note 159, at 184 (stating “whether Locke’s theory provides support
for any intellectual property rights is uncertain”); see also Hughes, supra note 162, at 300
(explaining that the Lockean explanation of intellectual property has immediate, intuitive
appeal and has been accepted by many).
194
Fisher, supra note 159, at 182.
195
See id. at 183 (referring to six different rationales found in the Second Treaties, and
pointing to certain of these rationales to make a stronger or weaker argument for
intellectual property rights).
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property: (1) one’s property (the fruit of his labor) must be
included in the commons for others to improve upon unless
removing it would leave “enough and as good” in common for
others to use; and (2) property should not be wasted.196 These
conditions suggest that intellectual property rights should not be so
great as to interfere with the rights of others. But Locke provided
little guidance as to the proportionality of these rights, which
leaves plenty of room for debate.197
At first glance, it may seem as though droit de suite works
under this theory—that artists deserve increased economic rights in
their artwork because of the labor they put into developing their
work and their reputation. However, justifying droit de suite under
labor theory would require a conflation of tangible property with
intellectual property. A painting or a sculpture is the fruit of the
artist’s labor and therefore, she owns the physical art object as
tangible property as well as the expression of the idea in the form
of intellectual property—that is, as long as ownership of such
things satisfies Locke’s two provisos. However, the rights of
others must limit the artist’s rights. When the artist sells an art
object to a buyer, that buyer compensates the artist by giving the
artist the fruit of his labor.198 If the market has its way, this
exchange is a trade for fair value. So if the artist is able to
continue to exert control over the art object, she is interfering with
the buyer’s right to fully exploit the fruit of his own labor (which is
now the art object by way of trade). Even though the artist may
retain control of the intellectual property in the art, she has yielded
her right in the tangible object to the buyer through the original
sale. That is, the artist may deserve any increase in the pecuniary
interests in the intellectual property in the art that results from the
labor she put into developing her reputation, but that does not
directly translate into a right to appropriate gains in the value of the
physical property she has already sold for fair value.
Furthermore, retaining a future interest in the art in the form of
a resale royalty right would likely be wasteful, violating Locke’s
196

Shiffrin, supra note 187, at 146–47.
See Fisher, supra note 159, at 189.
198
Locke favored use of money in such exchanges because money reduces waste,
thereby satisfying the second proviso. See Shiffrin, supra note 187, at 150.
197
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second proviso. As discussed above, applying the droit de suite
creates great administrative burdens, and the benefits that artists
receive are reduced when collective management agencies take
their fee.199 Additionally, as a restraint on alienation, a droit de
suite would reduce the likelihood that the physical property will be
exploited in the most efficient manner.200 This translates into
waste.201 Accordingly, under labor theory, the artist’s right to
privately own his artwork hardly justifies attaching a resale royalty
to the physical art object.
The question, then, is whether control of the intellectual
property in the art derived from the labor of creation entitles the
artist to a resale royalty. But the artist only sells the physical
object to the buyer, and the physical object is all the buyer wishes
to resell. The artist does not deserve anything more because she
has already extinguished her own rights in the physical property
even though she has retained the intellectual property. Of course,
one might argue that the artist’s labor in creating additional quality
work causes the value of her sold work to increase and therefore
she has improved upon that work. But she could not have actually
improved the tangible object, as it has not been in her possession
after the first sale, so she has merely improved her own reputation.
The artwork is still wholly the physical property of the buyer—
instead, she owns the fruit of her labor in the form of the new work
she will continue to create, which will be sold at higher prices.202
She deserves nothing more.

199

See supra notes 85–93 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text.
201
This concept may seem fairly abstract when applied to art, as “exploiting art”
essentially means looking at it, or even just owning it in the case of an art investor.
However, if the art is not owned by the individual who values it most (and therefore is
willing to pay the most for it), then it is not being exploited in the most efficient manner.
The droit de suite acts as a transaction cost that could potentially prevent the most
efficient result. For a discussion of how transaction costs lead to waste, see generally
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (establishing the Coase
Theorem which holds that bargaining results in the most efficient outcome when
transaction costs are absent).
202
See Gregory, supra note 56, at 188 (discussing the successful auction at Phillips de
Pury of a piece by artist Jacob Kassay, who was then represented by Eleven Rivington, a
lower east side New York art gallery: “Kassay did not directly benefit from his Phillips
triumph, of course—only the seller and the auction house did. But Eleven Rivington
200

C06_BUSSEY (DO NOT DELETE)

1102

4/17/2013 3:46 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:1063

In sum, the only theory of copyright that really comes close to
supporting droit de is the personality theory, and even that theory
has its shortcomings on the matter. Granted, droit de suite could
theoretically be justified as a non-intellectual property right, but
since its inception early in the twentieth century, it has been
intended to correct a perceived shortfall in copyright protection for
visual artists.203 And outside the realm of intellectual property,
droit de suite still acts as a restraint on alienation. Without strong
justification under any of these theories, droit de suite is
incompatible with systems of law that justify their copyright
regime under any of these theories. Further, the right creates
inconsistencies with little, if any, benefit for young artists.
Coupled with the fact that droit de suite has failed to work as
hoped in practice, it makes little sense to continue pushing for droit
de suite laws in the international community.
C. Alternatives to Droit de Suite
Assuming the issues that droit de suite aims to correct actually
require correction, implementing civil law style droit de suite is not
the only option. Artists can contractually obligate a buyer to pay a
royalty upon resale—knowing full well that this decreases the
initial sale price—and occasionally they do.204 This allows artists
to decide if they want a resale royalty or not. Critics might argue
that artists are not in equal bargaining power with their buyers and
so this is not a viable option, but artists have the backing of their
dealers who have stronger bargaining power.
Similarly, a droit de suite law that allows the right to be waived
would give the artist the option of whether or not she wants to
enjoy the right. However, the same unequal bargaining argument
applies here as with leaving resale royalties up to contractual
negotiations. But a waiveable and alienable droit de suite would fit
more comfortably amongst the other rights of copyright holders in

responded by raising his prices, and those prices remain high. When things go as well as
they have for Kassay, everyone winds up happy.”).
203
See supra notes 21–26 and accompanying text.
204
Boyd, supra note 102.
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common law nations.205 This arrangement would make the right
easier to justify under the utilitarian theory, as it could eliminate
the problem of decreased primary market prices that theoretically
results in less production of art by less established artists. When
droit de suite was originally imagined, it was made unwaiveable
and inalienable because it was considered to be a moral right that
derived from the personhood theory of copyright. But considering
the pecuniary benefits the right is designed to create, it makes more
sense to treat droit de suite as an economic right like the right of
reproduction and the right of performance or display. Making the
right waiveable and transferable would also mitigate the conflicts
with property law and the free alienability of property, and
therefore make it easier to justify under the labor theory of
copyright.
Another alternative to droit de suite would be increased
display-based rights for artists. In its report on droit de suite in
1992, the U.S. Register of Copyrights suggested that broader
display rights might be a better idea than a resale royalty right.206
Currently, U.S. copyright law provides a right of display that is
extinguished by the first sale doctrine.207 A modification of this
law that grants special display rights to visual works of art could be
crafted to require museums and galleries to pay the artists to show
the work. Such a right would be similar to the right of
performance enjoyed by playwrights and musicians and would not
put a restraint on alienation in the way that droit de suite does.
Furthermore, this would fit more comfortably within an intellectual
property regime because the display of an image is more closely
related to the intellectual property in the image than to the physical
art object. It would not likely have the same detrimental effect on
the price of art on the primary market as droit de suite opponents
expect, so it seems more likely to promote progress through
205

See Merryman, supra note 3, at 123–24 (explaining how making the driot de suite
unwaivable undercuts democratic law, by imposing legal protection even against the
authors will).
206
See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. REG. OF COPYRIGHTS, DROIT DE SUITE: THE
ARTIST’S RESALE ROYALTY (1992).
207
17 U.S.C. §§ 106(5), 109 (2006) (“[T]he owner of a particular copy . . . is entitled,
without the authority of the copyright owner, to display that copy publicly . . . to viewers
present at the place where the copy is located.”).

C06_BUSSEY (DO NOT DELETE)

1104

4/17/2013 3:46 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:1063

increased production of art. However, this might be detrimental to
the public through increased museum entrance costs and the
negative side effects should be carefully analyzed before seriously
considering such an option.
CONCLUSION
Despite strong evidence that droit de suite laws fail to provide
most artists with greater economic security and may in fact be a
burden for most artists, providing such a right to artists is
becoming more common in global copyright regimes. With full
implementation throughout the European Union now in effect, the
pressure for other nations to implement the right will continue to
increase. But droit de suite has never lived up to the expectations
of lawmakers. The right fails to benefit the individuals it means
to—starving artists and their starving heirs—and instead benefits
the few rich artists who dominate the secondary art market and the
administrative agencies and bureaucracies that oversee the
distribution of royalties. Furthermore, droit de suite is an alien
concept to Anglo-American common law, and it contradicts
several well-established doctrines.
All nations that do not already enforce a droit de suite should
be wary of the political pressure to do so regardless of which
theories of intellectual property they use to justify their copyright
systems. Droit de suite has an economic focus that is hardly a true
concern of the personality theory; it fails to incentivize progress in
art or benefit most artists monetarily as the utilitarian theory
requires; and it provides a right beyond the confines of labor
theory by interfering with the buyer’s right to control his property
while failing to minimize waste by introducing inefficient
transaction costs. Though a droit de suite law surely has good
intentions, it would likely do far more harm than good for both
creators of cultural heritage and the public at large that benefits
from the creative work.

